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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

15 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : William W. Wells  
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LECTURES: Front  
(Army) Offensive Operations with Conventional  
Weapons

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on a collection of seven lectures, classified SECRET, prepared by the General Staff Academy for publication by the First Directorate (Operations) of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in October 1969. This report is a translation from Russian of a lecture dealing with the preparation and conduct of offensive operations without the employment of nuclear weapons. The lecture covers general concepts and methods, procedures for planning and support, and the organization of control. Topics covered under the actual conduct of an operation include meeting engagements, the negotiation of a defense, and the development of an offensive into the depth of enemy territory. The going over to nuclear operations also is discussed briefly. This lecture was prepared in March 1969. The Russian-language version was disseminated as FIRDB-312/00526-76.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

William W. Wells

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## Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR

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### SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LECTURES: The Preparation and  
Conduct of a Front (Army) Offensive Operation Without  
the Employment of Nuclear Weapons

SOURCE Documentary

### Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a lecture, classified SECRET, prepared by Colonel General I. S. Glebov, which deals with offensive operations with conventional weapons as applied to the Western Theater of Military Operations. The lecture covers general concepts and methods, procedures for planning and support, and the organization of control. Topics covered under the actual conduct of an operation include meeting engagements, the negotiation of a defense, and the development of an offensive into the depth of enemy territory. The lecture concludes with a brief discussion of the going over to nuclear operations.

End of Summary

### Comment

The Russian-language version of this lecture was disseminated as FIRDB-312/00326-76.

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ORDERS OF LENIN AND SUVOROV  
MILITARY ACADEMY OF THE GENERAL STAFF  
OF THE USSR ARMED FORCES

APPROVED  
Chief of the Academy  
General of the Army S. P. Ivanov  
4 March 1969

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Professor Colonel General I. S. Glebov

THE PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF A FRONT (ARMY)  
OFFENSIVE OPERATION WITHOUT THE  
EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1969

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## INTRODUCTION

A future world war is first and foremost a nuclear war. It may begin with either unlimited or limited employment of nuclear weapons. There may also develop a situation in which military actions will begin without the employment of nuclear weapons. //

The actual status and the main trend of future development of the armed forces of the capitalist states, particularly the United States of America, indicate their preparation for nuclear war. However, the changed balance of forces between socialism and capitalism obliges the leading political and military officials of the West to admit the possibility of having to wage war against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for a certain period of time with the employment of conventional means of destruction alone or with limited employment of nuclear weapons. These views found expression in the concept, adopted at a December (1967) session of the NATO Council, of "Phased Response Actions Employing Conventional or Nuclear Weapons Depending on the Degree of Threat". //

In the armies of the imperialist NATO states, there is not only discussion of theoretical questions of conducting combat actions without the employment of nuclear weapons, but troops and staffs are actually being trained to conduct such actions. Ground forces, air forces, and naval forces are being equipped with new models of conventional weapons, and every year, dating back to 1961, large-scale exercises are conducted employing conventional means of destruction, with subsequent going over to the employment of nuclear weapons. //

As is known, the changes which have taken place in the imperialist NATO bloc are being taken into account in the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. Over recent years, theoretical research and war games have been conducted to find the most desirable methods of conducting battles and operations employing only conventional means of destruction, with a subsequent going over to the employment of nuclear weapons. By the present time, a basic unity of views has developed on the conduct of operations without the employment of nuclear weapons. //

The purpose of this lecture is to set forth the general principles and basic questions of preparing and conducting a

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present-day front (army) offensive operation without the employment of nuclear weapons, with a subsequent going over to their employment, applicable to the conditions of the Western Theater of Military Operations.

### GENERAL PRINCIPLES

#### Role, goals, tasks, and scope of a front (army) offensive operation

Since nuclear forces will not be employed in the non-nuclear period of a strategic operation in a theater, the main role in routing opposing enemy forces in the ground portion of the theater will belong to the ground forces, i.e. to fronts and to the combined-arms armies and tank armies they comprise. In doing so, the front troops will carry out their tasks in close cooperation with aviation and with the air defense forces of the country, and, where there are actions on coastal axes, with naval forces as well.

The main means for inflicting fire destruction on the enemy will, of course, be aviation, artillery, and tanks. Aviation is the main means of gaining supremacy in the air and delivering strikes against groupings and other targets in the depth, without which it is impossible to count on successful ground forces actions employing only conventional means of destruction. Aviation will also destroy nuclear means and deliver strikes against artillery, immediate and approaching enemy reserves, and enemy control posts.

Artillery will become the main means of striking the enemy in the tactical depth and of continuous fire support for the combat actions of motorized rifle troops and tank troops. It will carry out its tasks in close cooperation with front aviation, tanks, and the fire means of motorized rifle troops and will destroy (neutralize) tactical nuclear weapons, tanks, artillery, fire means, personnel, control posts, and other enemy targets. By destroying these targets, artillery will support the attack by tank troops and motorized rifle troops and will support their advance to the full depth of their assigned tasks.

N A particularly important role will belong to tanks, which combine within themselves powerful fire, striking force, and

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maneuver. They are capable, exploiting the effects of artillery fire and air strikes, of carrying out tasks independently or together with motorized infantry to rout opposing enemy groupings.

In organizing an offensive it is necessary to take into account the actual combat capabilities of the means of destruction. Thus, a front can, with its main aviation forces, deliver massed and grouped strikes against the enemy to a maximum depth of 350 to 450 kilometers. With this, its fighter-bomber aviation is capable of carrying out such strikes to a depth of 150 to 250 kilometers. A fighter-bomber division is capable, in one day of combat with two or three sorties, of inflicting destruction (up to 20 percent losses) on one to two enemy brigades.

It should also be taken into account that the actions of aviation under these conditions will entail the need to negotiate the enemy air defense, which under these conditions may be very enduring and stable. This will require allocating part of the aviation forces for combat against the enemy air defense means.

The main mass of artillery is within the complement of the troops of the armies. It is capable of inflicting destruction on the enemy to a depth of 15 to 18 kilometers and, with part of its forces, to over 20 kilometers. With this, the artillery of the combined-arms army can neutralize personnel and fire means outside of shelters over a maximum front of 15 kilometers, but it can neutralize personnel and fire means in shelters only over a front of about eight kilometers. Enemy troops subjected to artillery strikes with the density of fire adopted by our regulations (150 shells of 122-mm caliber per hectare) may sustain losses, at best, of the order of 20 percent. At the same time, destruction of tanks, particularly those which are sheltered (dug in), is unlikely.

The high degree of equipping of the troops with tanks, combat vehicles, and armored personnel carriers makes it possible to set up sufficiently powerful attack groupings of troops within short periods of time and to conduct an offensive with artillery and air support in order to rout enemy groupings on selected axes and in selected sectors.

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Calculations show that troops of a front can deliver attacks on two, sometimes three, axes, while troops of an army can deliver attacks on one axis or, more rarely, on two axes.

The examined capabilities of conventional means of destruction show that a front, in an offensive operation without the employment of nuclear weapons, can, at the same time, take effective action in selected sectors of attack against the first-echelon troops and, to some extent, against the aviation and the army corps reserves of an army group, i.e., the depth of a front offensive operation without the employment of nuclear weapons may be 350 to 450 kilometers.

The rate of advance of the troops will depend above all on the extent of destruction of enemy groupings by air strikes and artillery strikes, on the establishment of the necessary superiority over them in forces, especially in artillery and tanks on decisive axes, on the nature of enemy actions, and on maximum exploitation of the fire and maneuver capabilities of the tank troops and motorized rifle troops. According to the experience of training exercises with troops, the rate of advance of the troops may be 20 to 30 kilometers per day when breaking through the defense, and up to 50 kilometers or more when developing an offensive in the depth. The average rate of advance in an operation may be about 35 to 40 kilometers, and the duration of a front operation may be 10 to 12 days or more. The width of the offensive zone may be the same as when conducting an offensive with the employment of nuclear weapons.

The specific goals of the operation of each front are determined, as is known, by the concept of the strategic operation in the theater of military operations, by the combat capabilities of the front, by the enemy's grouping and the nature of his actions, by the importance of the theater, and by other factors.

Based on the combat capabilities of the front troops and the possible enemy grouping, the goal of a front operation without the employment of nuclear weapons may be, in general terms, to rout the main enemy groupings with their nuclear means deployed in the offensive zone of the front and to seize important areas (installations) of operational-strategic significance. As applied to the Western Theater of Military Operations, the goal

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will be to rout the opposing enemy grouping and its reserves to the full depth of the disposition of the army group on selected axes of attack (150 to 200 kilometers) and also to rout other opposing groupings and reserves within the remainder of the depth and to seize areas (installations) of operational-strategic significance, including the main basing areas of tactical aviation (300 to 500 kilometers and more), capture of which will create favorable conditions for the subsequent advance into the central areas of the theater.

#### Methods of conducting an operation

On the whole, the methods of conducting an operation and routing enemy groupings in a non-nuclear period will obviously be based on the experience of employing aviation, artillery, and mechanized and tank large units and armies in deep offensive operations during the Great Patriotic War; taking into account, of course, the changes which have taken place in the organization, equipping, and combat capabilities of troops, and also taking account of the possibility of an enemy nuclear strike at any time. The method of conducting an offensive operation will in each instance be determined on the basis of the concept of the strategic offensive operation of the group of fronts.

The main methods of conducting a front offensive operation may be: the delivery of two, and sometimes three, attacks for the purpose of splintering the enemy troops and destroying them in detail, or the delivery of attacks along converging axes in order to encircle and destroy the main enemy forces.

The delivery of attacks on several axes makes it possible to "hack" into the disposition of an enemy grouping, split the enemy troops into groupings isolated from one another, and provide for the rout of groupings which have been separated and have lost effective communications. The use of such a method of conducting an operation makes it difficult for the enemy to select groupings and installations for nuclear strikes, facilitates secrecy in preparing the operation, and contributes to the achievement of surprise, which is very important under present-day conditions.

The delivery of attacks on converging axes for encirclement of the enemy may take place, for example, in circumstances when his main forces are located in the immediate depth and he has no

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large reserves on the axis of attacks of the front or when the configuration of the front line favors the use of such a method of conducting the operation.

The encirclement and the destruction of the surrounded enemy may be carried out in cooperation with other fronts or with the forces of one front. In no case must the encirclement and destruction of the enemy entail reduction of the overall rate of advance or delay of the rapid advance of the main forces into the depth.

The main method of conducting army operations without the employment of nuclear weapons is to deliver an attack on one or two axes, jointly or in cooperation with adjacent armies in order to rout enemy groupings on the axes of attack, and to split up and destroy in detail the main forces of the opposing groupings and the immediate reserves.

Within the framework of an army offensive operation, encirclement will usually take place during the destruction of enemy groupings which have been split up as a result of the initial attacks of the front-army.

Under appropriate conditions it is possible to use the enumerated methods when conducting the same operation in a different context. For instance, the immediate task may be carried out by actions for encirclement, and the subsequent task may be carried out by actions on several axes. The reverse is also possible: first, attacks on several axes; then, actions for encirclement.

In selecting any method of conducting an operation, it is important to concentrate, on the selected axes of attacks, the efforts of aviation, artillery, and tank troops and motorized rifle troops, in combination with airborne landings -- and with amphibious landings as well on coastal axes -- in order to achieve decisive superiority ensuring the infliction of a decisive defeat on the enemy. As calculations show, a front offensive operation on a main axis requires concentration of the efforts of two to three armies, an air army, the main forces of the reinforcing artillery, forces of the air defense of the country, and other branch arms and services. Such a concentration of efforts will make it possible within a short

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time to establish a breach in the enemy operational disposition on a front 30 to 50 kilometers wide. On other axes it will be necessary to concentrate the efforts of one to two armies, which will also make it possible to open a breach in the enemy first echelon on a front 15 to 30 kilometers wide. The breaches which have been established are exploited by tank troops and airborne landing forces for rapid development of an advance into the deep enemy rear and, at the same time, by motorized rifle troops (possibly also tank troops) for actions against the flanks and rear of the split-up or encircled enemy groupings.

#### Methods of routing large enemy groupings

The routing of enemy groupings must be based on a combination of massed air strikes, artillery fire, and rapid actions by tank troops and motorized rifle troops, with the employment of airborne landing forces. Depending on the situation, there must, in some instances, be aviation and artillery preparation in order to rout a defending enemy; in other instances, when the enemy has not yet deployed his main forces or has taken up the defense in haste, it may be sufficient to deliver air strikes and artillery strikes. In all instances, the advance of the troops must be accompanied by the actions of aviation and artillery fire.

However, it must be taken into account that such a concentration of efforts on an axis of attacks requires the establishment of high troop densities, and this is risky in case of the going over to conducting the offensive with the employment of nuclear weapons. Therefore, dense dispositions of attack groupings must be of short duration, for the time needed to carry out the initial tasks of an attack. The implementation of the concentration of efforts on the axes of attacks must be based on maneuvering the troops along axes converging toward the sectors of attacks. After delivery of an attack, troop actions must be directed toward rapid penetration into the depth and advancing to the enemy's flank and rear in order to destroy him in detail, during which dispersal of the troops must be ensured. It goes without saying that during this period special attention must be devoted to the readiness of the rocket troops and the air army for delivery of the initial nuclear strike and also to adherence to the requirements for troop protection.

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Since the action range and the effectiveness of conventional means of destruction allow only a limited number of enemy installations and troops to be hit simultaneously and reliably, the rout of enemy groupings may be carried out for the most part successively, by depth and along the front. The main forces and means of the front are concentrated in selected sectors of attacks, primarily opposite those enemy groupings by whose routing the enemy's operational stability is upset and such breaches are established in his disposition as to provide for subsequently destroying him in detail.

It is important to "root out" the most important elements (strong or weak -- this depends on the situation) in the enemy troop grouping, whose loss will create the opportunity both for rapid development of the offensive into the depth and for advancing to the flanks and rear of other enemy groupings in order to rout them.

When advancing in mountainous areas, where the enemy may have, on some axes, favorable defense lines within his depth, it is important that he not be allowed to utilize them.

In connection with this, it is advisable to plan such frontal attacks against the opposing enemy grouping in combination with maneuvering by part of the forces in order to advance to the flank and rear of this grouping to prevent the withdrawal of enemy forces to the defense lines within the depth. Together with this, it is important to deliver air strikes on the enemy reserves in order to prevent or delay the occupation of the lines within the depth by these reserves until the lines can be seized by our troops.

Under conditions of mountainous terrain, the successful routing of enemy groupings may also be assisted by utilizing secondary, sometimes poorly accessible, axes for actions against them by mobile flanking or forward detachments -- weak in personnel strength but strong in striking power, supported when necessary by air strikes -- which subsequently advance to the axes of the actions of the main enemy forces. Such a method of action will also contribute to the splitting up of the enemy groupings and their destruction in detail and to the seizing of crossings, road junctions, and sectors of defense positions on the most important axes and simultaneously on a series of lines

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echeloned into the depth of his defense.

The use of airborne landing forces will establish centers of combat actions in the enemy rear and will make it possible to deliver attacks from axes not expected by the enemy and thereby to actually impose a new combat front upon him. This makes the enemy disperse the efforts of his troops. Moreover, this type of combat actions makes it difficult for the enemy to choose targets for nuclear strikes in the event of going over to the employment of nuclear weapons.

The routing of an enemy grouping in mountains may be carried out also by pushing the grouping back and driving it into a poorly accessible area, the passes through which will have been seized by airborne landing forces and flanking detachments.

#### THE PREPARATION OF A FRONT (ARMY) OFFENSIVE OPERATION

The preparation of a front (army) offensive operation employing only conventional means of destruction is carried out simultaneously with the preparation of an operation employing nuclear weapons.

Particular attention in preparing a non-nuclear operation is devoted to: the establishment of attack groupings; the employment of front aviation both in operations to gain air supremacy and in operations to support the offensive of the front troops; the employment of artillery; the employment of tank troops in cooperation with aviation and airborne landing forces for rapid development of an offensive into the enemy depth; the organization of the front air defense troops; and the materiel support of the troops in such an operation, particularly with ammunition and fuel.

#### Making a decision

Proceeding from the goals and tasks which will be assigned to a front (army) in the non-nuclear period of a strategic operation, the commander makes a decision for conducting the operation with the employment of only conventional means simultaneously with making a decision for the operation with the employment of nuclear weapons. In doing this, special coordination is given to questions of establishing and deploying

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attack groupings of troops, ensuring constant readiness to employ nuclear weapons, and organizing the protection of the troops.

The methods of conducting an operation and particularly the methods of routing the enemy groupings, on which the concept of the decision for the operation is based, will be different than when conducting an operation with the employment of nuclear weapons, as is evident from a review of the general principles on the conduct of an offensive operation employing conventional means of destruction.

In the concept of the decision it is important to specify in what order and by what method the main enemy groupings on the axis of the main attack and of other attacks are to be routed, in strict conformity with the combat capabilities of the front troops and the opposing enemy and providing for an overwhelming superiority, on the sectors of attacks of each axis, in artillery, tanks, and motorized infantry, and for the employment of front aviation primarily on the main axis, principally in cooperation with tank troops and airborne landing forces. Together with this, plans must be made for the uninterrupted buildup of forces and means on selected axes of attacks for rapid attainment of the goals of the operation.

All in all, the decision for an operation must provide for speed and aggressiveness in the actions of all forces and means, must disrupt enemy attempts to switch the fighting to positional forms of combat, and must preempt the enemy with our own actions, having our nuclear weapons in constant readiness for employment and maintaining a high level of protection of our own troops against enemy means of mass destruction.

#### The planning and support of an operation

We proceed from the unity of planning for a front (army) offensive operation, both with and without the employment of nuclear weapons.

The advisability of unified and simultaneous planning stems from the fact that the advance of the troops when war begins may start with or without the employment of nuclear weapons, which we obviously cannot know in advance. In both cases, basically the same forces and means, except for nuclear weapons, will be at the

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front's disposal. Moreover, if military actions begin with the employment of conventional means only, the operations of ground forces may at any moment escalate into nuclear operations.

It is very important in planning, as the experience of the Great Patriotic War shows, to coordinate in detail the employment of aviation and artillery and the actions of motorized rifle troops and tank troops. The actions of the advancing troops and the employment of these means of destruction to the depth of the immediate tasks of the armies of the front's first echelon should be planned by days of the operation, assigning main tasks to the troops for each day. The troop advance, deployment, and going over to the offensive must be planned in particular detail, as well as their actions for the first day of the offensive. The first day of the operation must be planned with consideration for the possible conditions under which combat actions may unfold. However, it should be attempted to implement the going over of the front troops to the offensive with surprise, simultaneously with or immediately after the strike by the aircraft carrying out the air operation.

The establishment of attack groupings, as shown by the experience of the Great Patriotic War (especially regarding the employment of armored forces) and by research, must be based on full exploitation of the maneuver capabilities of the troops to ensure the disruption of an enemy surprise attack, the repulse of his breakthrough, the delivery of a preemptive (surprise) attack against the main enemy troop groupings by superior forces (one and one-half to twofold) on selected axes, and the establishment of overwhelming superiority (not less than threefold to fourfold) in artillery and tanks in the sectors of attack.

Planning for the employment of front aviation in an operation to gain supremacy in the air is carried out on the basis of instructions from the High Command. The actions of front aviation in support of advancing front troops are concentrated on the main axis in order to carry out the main tasks, primarily actions in support of tank troops and airborne landing forces.

In planning the employment of the artillery of front (army) attack groupings it is advisable to utilize the experience of the last war and of postwar operational training in organizing and carrying out artillery support of an attack. In doing this, the

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concentration of artillery in the sectors of attacks must be planned on the basis of full exploitation of the increased mobility of present-day artillery. The deployment of artillery for the support of troop actions from the march must anticipate in its timing the movement forward and deployment of the main forces of motorized rifle troops and tank troops.

In order to develop a rapid offensive into the depth, the attack grouping of front (army) troops must have and must employ tank armies (divisions) and airborne landing forces.

Tank armies (divisions), after the enemy has been routed in the sector of attack, must be allocated for rapid advance and penetration, with air support and in cooperation with airborne landing forces, into the deep enemy rear in order to disorganize the enemy's control, to rout and contain his deep reserves, and, if circumstances are favorable, to encircle and destroy the main enemy groupings in cooperation with combined-arms armies (motorized rifle divisions).

The employment of operational airborne landing forces is planned by the Supreme High Command, or in certain instances by the front command. The employment of tactical airborne landing forces is planned by the army. The general goal in employing them is to develop combat actions in the enemy rear jointly with tank troops to rout enemy reserves and to seize or destroy important installations and control posts in order to assist the rapid advance of the troops.

For successful employment of landings, it is necessary to exploit the favorable conditions which are created with the entry of the advancing troops, especially the tank troops, into the enemy depth. It is advisable to select the flight routes for a landing on an axis on which it is planned to inflict decisive destruction upon the enemy and also where he does not have a strong air defense. In doing so, neutralization of air defense installations in the overflight zone should be provided for in all instances.

In order to develop a rapid offensive, the operational plan must provide for a buildup of troop efforts through committing to action the second echelons and reserves of the armies and fronts and also through maneuvering troops from secondary sectors to the

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main, decisive axes. The great mobility of troops today makes it possible to carry out within a short time the movement forward of considerable forces over great distances by organic means and to commit them to action from the march. But this requires that the buildup of efforts be thoroughly planned in advance, comprehensively supported, and reliably covered against enemy air strikes.

The air defense troops must provide a highly reliable covering of the attack groupings, particularly during the period of maximum concentration of motorized rifle troops and tank troops in the sectors of attacks, utilizing the high maneuverability of the air defense troops for this purpose.

Specially planned are measures for ensuring the constant high readiness of missile/nuclear weapons for employment at any time, as the situation may demand.

Fully provided for are all measures for protecting the troops against means of mass destruction. They are planned with great thoroughness for the period when forces and means are concentrated in the sectors of attacks.

In the plan for reconnaissance, special attention must be given to detecting weak spots in enemy groupings and to reconnaissance of all targets necessary for the artillery in conducting artillery preparation and accompanying the advancing troops in the sectors of attack. All in all, reconnaissance must provide for anticipating the possible nature of enemy actions in order to assist in the timely making of a decision and the selection of an advisable method of routing the enemy. A special task of reconnaissance will be the timely detection of enemy preparation for the employment of nuclear weapons, which will enable us to ensure delivery of a preemptive nuclear strike against the enemy on the basis of the first indications that he is preparing for a nuclear attack.

The requirement for artillery ammunition and for POL for an operation is carefully calculated in order to stockpile the needed reserves of them before the start of military actions. Measures for the delivery of ammunition and POL during the operation are planned at the same time, since the need for them will be greater than in an operation employing nuclear weapons.

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Specially provided for are measures for operational camouflage, which must, under conditions of the unleashing of military actions without the employment of nuclear weapons, ensure the secrecy of preparation and the surprise of the actions of our troops.

#### The organization of control

In an offensive employing conventional means of destruction, troop control will be based on the same principles and precepts as in conducting an offensive with the employment of nuclear weapons. The control posts -- the command post, the forward command post, and the rear control post -- must be reliably equipped and prepared also, just as in an operation beginning with the employment of nuclear weapons.

However, the role of the forward command post in a non-nuclear period may increase considerably, since under these conditions the front (army) commander will have to be located near the troops of the first echelon in order to exert a more effective influence on the course of combat actions. In this connection, it will clearly be necessary to reinforce the complement of the forward command post and the communications means.

#### THE CONDUCT OF AN OPERATION

##### The general nature of combat actions

The success of a front (army) offensive employing only conventional means of destruction is predetermined to a considerable degree by the timely bringing of the troops to full combat readiness, by their well-organized movement forward, deployment, and going over to the offensive, by rapid seizure of the initiative, and by the gaining of supremacy in the air. In all instances, we must strive to deliver surprise (preemptive) attacks against the enemy in order to rout his main forces in the border zone.

If the beginning of war is preceded by a period of threat, even of short duration, there is the possibility of moving up and deploying front (army) troops in advance in a relatively planned manner.

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First-echelon large units will be able to move up close to the border and occupy waiting areas or deployment lines, from which they intend to go over to the offensive. The artillery will occupy fire positions, and aviation will rebase to alternate and field airfields. The going over of the troops to the offensive under these conditions may be carried out by advancing from the depth (from waiting areas) and also from positions in direct contact with enemy covering units.

However, even under these maximally favorable conditions, it will hardly be possible, through the employment of only conventional means of destruction, to succeed in inflicting decisive destruction on the enemy border groupings in the entire offensive zone of the front and to deprive them of their offensive capabilities, i.e., to disrupt the enemy offensive. This goal can most probably be achieved only on the most important individual axes. It must therefore be expected that under the given conditions the enemy will strive for aggressive, offensive actions, and this may lead to the occurrence of meeting battles and engagements in the border zone.

The most complicated conditions for the going over of the troops to the offensive are created in the case of a surprise attack by the enemy. In this situation, the troops will most probably have to move up to the border directly from their permanent deployment areas.

The most important conditions for the successful conduct of an offensive will be: decisive concentration of the efforts of front (army) troops on the main axis; reliable neutralization of opposing enemy forces by fire from all means of destruction; skilful exploitation of mobility and striking force, above all of the tank armies (divisions), for rapid penetration into the depth of the enemy disposition; timely movement forward and shifting of position of all other forces and means, exploiting maneuver capabilities to the limit (when necessary); rapid reforming of troops from one disposition to another in accordance with the developing situation; and extensive employment of tactical airborne landing forces and sabotage-reconnaissance groups to destroy nuclear strike means, communications means, and other important installations and to disrupt the movement of enemy troops by road and disorganize the functioning of the enemy rear.

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The foundation for routing enemy groupings must be laid by air strikes and artillery strikes and by the rapid advance of motorized rifle troops and tank troops with close support of their combat actions by aviation and artillery. The methods used here, and the degree of fire destruction inflicted on the enemy, will depend on the composition and the nature of the actions of his troops. As already indicated, in some cases fire preparation and aviation preparation will have to be conducted in order to rout the enemy, while in other situations, when the enemy has not deployed or has taken up the defense in haste, air strikes and artillery fire strikes may be sufficient.

Depending on the position and status of enemy forces and means, accompanying of the advancing motorized rifle troops and tank troops by artillery and aviation is set up. If the enemy is prepared to repulse our attack, the accompanying may be carried out by a moving barrage of fire, while in other cases it may be carried out by a successive concentration of fire or by a combination of these methods. It is advisable to employ aviation mainly for the accompanying of tank groupings, especially when developing an offensive into the depth.

Artillery and motorized rifle troops and tank troops, in order to rout enemy groupings and create a decisive superiority in forces and means, may be concentrated in selected sectors of attacks on converging axes and may be deployed into battle formations from the march. During this concentration period, of course, very strong troop groupings may be established; this requires the reliable destruction (neutralization) of enemy tactical and operational-tactical nuclear means, the strengthening of the covering of the troops against air strikes, and the rapid carrying out of the attack, with subsequent dispersal of the forces.

Following the aviation preparation and fire preparation, the troops rapidly attack the enemy, develop a breakthrough in depth, expand it toward one or both flanks, and conduct combat actions on axes for the encirclement of the enemy groupings and their destruction in detail. In this, the main task of the tank groupings, in cooperation with aviation and an airborne landing force, will be to advance rapidly into the enemy rear and quickly develop an offensive into the depth. This will keep the enemy from reestablishing a solid front and imposing positional forms

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of combat upon us.

#### Routing the enemy in meeting engagements

Meeting engagements can occur both at the beginning of an offensive and during its course, on one axis or on several, both simultaneously and successively. If meeting engagements occur on several axes and the front (army) has sufficient forces and means to conduct them, then the rout of the enemy by means of offensive actions may be carried out simultaneously on all axes. When there are not enough forces and means to rout the enemy in the meeting engagements simultaneously, the main efforts are directed, at first, to routing the main enemy grouping; on the other axes, the troops can temporarily conduct defensive actions, and then, as the main enemy grouping is routed, they will renew the offensive.

Meeting engagements will usually occur and proceed in a complex, rapidly changing situation. They may occur unexpectedly for one side, or, quite often, for both sides. Such engagements conducted with the employment of only conventional means of destruction will have the same features as under conditions of the employment of nuclear weapons, i.e., an unclear situation, an intense struggle to seize the initiative and gain time, the presence of unprotected flanks of the opposing sides, and others. At the same time, under the conditions being examined, the meeting engagements will have substantial differences from similar engagements under conditions of the employment of nuclear weapons.

Preempting the enemy in delivering air strikes, in opening artillery fire, in deploying all forces and means, and in establishing the necessary superiority in forces and means on selected axes of attack is becoming a decisive factor in achieving success in a meeting engagement.

The delivery of air strikes against enemy groupings moving forward will make it possible to weaken the enemy while he is still approaching, to disorganize his deployment in a planned manner, and to create conditions for destroying him in detail. For this purpose, air strikes must be directed first against the first echelon of the enemy troops operating on the main axis, and then against his reserves, in order to delay them, inflict

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destruction upon them, and isolate them from the main forces.

Preempting the enemy in opening fire with artillery will create favorable preconditions for inflicting a decisive defeat upon him through actions by tank troops and motorized rifle troops. In order to achieve this, the artillery should be brought up at the heads of the marching columns, and be regrouped and deployed into new sitting areas in advance.

Preempting in the delivery of air strikes and in opening artillery fire and also in deployment and going over to the offensive of front (army) troops can lead to the defeat of an enemy who is stronger but has not succeeded in deploying.

The most favorable method of routing in a meeting engagement is a rapid attack, primarily by the tank troops of the front (army) against the flanks of the main forces of the enemy before they are deployed, with simultaneous containment of the enemy by part of our forces employing frontal meeting attacks.

If the position of the advancing front (army) troops or the terrain conditions make it impossible to carry out a double envelopment or an outflanking movement, then an attack may be delivered by the main forces against one flank, in conjunction with frontal containment of the main enemy grouping by part of our own forces.

In a situation in which the main attack groupings of front (army) troops are for any reason unable to move forward to the flanks or rear of the advancing main forces of the enemy within the designated time, it is expedient to deliver frontal splitting attacks in order to split up the enemy and destroy him in detail.

In all instances, the concept of the front (army) commander in a meeting engagement must be simple, must clearly specify the grouping of forces and means, the sequence of their deployment, and the main axis and other axes of advance of the troops.

During the rout of the enemy first echelon in a meeting engagement, combat must be carried on simultaneously with the enemy reserves and with troops which have been regrouped from other axes. Their approach to the area of the engagement can be interdicted by the combined efforts of long range aviation and

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front aviation and also by the actions of large units (units) which have broken out forward and of airborne landing forces.

Airborne landing forces dropped into the enemy rear are employed to delay the movement forward of enemy troops and to disrupt their maneuvering by seizing road junctions, bridges, and crossings over water obstacles and by actions against enemy transportation lines. They can also seize favorable areas and hold them until the arrival of the front (army) troops allocated for conducting the meeting engagement. In addition, landing forces can deliver attacks against the unprotected flanks and rear of enemy units moving forward or deploying, against his control posts, against his nuclear strike means, and against his radiotechnical means.

The second echelons (reserves) of armies, and when necessary the front reserves as well, are usually committed to action to build up the attack forces on the main axis. Part of the forces of the second echelons, especially in the armies, may be employed to rout outflanking enemy groupings.

Antitank reserves, mobile obstacle detachments, and other special reserves are employed to support the deployment of the troops for conducting the meeting engagement.

The combat actions of front (army) troops in a meeting engagement will usually proceed under conditions of mutual deep envelopments and outflankings. Therefore rapid shifts of efforts from one axis to another will be characteristic of the actions of troop groupings conducting a meeting engagement (battles). In this connection, quite often the threat of enemy attacks on the flanks of these groupings may be created. In case such a threat arises, strikes are delivered against the most dangerous enemy troop groupings by aviation and long-range artillery, and then their routing is completed by an attack by part of the forces of the attack groupings of the front (army) troops. In addition, covering the exposed flanks is implemented by setting up engineer obstacles and by antitank artillery means, and sometimes combined-arms reserves and other reserves are employed for this purpose.

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### Negotiating the enemy defense

In an offensive without the employment of nuclear weapons, front (army) troops may encounter the enemy defense near the state border or at varying distances from it. This defense will usually be characterized by the presence of large gaps and intervals between the defending units and subunits, different degrees of resistance from them, and non-uniform engineer preparation of the areas (lines). Therefore, in order to negotiate such a defense, there must be on each axis troop groupings of different composition, a different sequence and degree of fire neutralization of the enemy, and different operating methods for large units and units. On some axes where there are gaps in the combat disposition of the enemy troops, the negotiating of his defense will take place principally from the march, by outflankings and envelopments of his groupings and by delivering attacks on their flanks and rear. In other sectors of the front, where the enemy sets up a solid defense, its negotiation may begin with a breakthrough which consists of breaking into the defense by fire from artillery, tanks, and antitank guided missiles, by air strikes, and by an attack by motorized rifle troops and tank troops with subsequent development of actions into the depth and toward the flanks.

If the enemy takes up the defense near the state border with his main forces, his opposition is negotiated from the march by troops of the first echelons of the armies, immediately following fire preparation conducted while our troops are still moving forward to the area (line) occupied by the enemy. When the enemy defense has been reliably neutralized, motorized rifle troops of the first echelon, exploiting gaps in the enemy combat disposition, may attack in armored personnel carriers (combat vehicles). If for any reason the attack is made with the troops dismounted, the armored personnel carriers (combat vehicles), advancing from line to line, provide fire support for the attacking subunits. After negotiating enemy opposition, the motorized rifle subunits will mount the armored personnel carriers (combat vehicles) and, together with the tanks, continue to advance rapidly into the depth, not becoming involved in drawn-out battles in the border zone.

In a situation in which the enemy deploys his main forces at a considerable distance from the state border and prepares the

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N border zone as a covering zone, the first-echelon large units will require some time to negotiate this zone and destroy the covering units operating within it.

The enemy covering zone must be negotiated at a rapid rate of advance. The destruction of units (subunits) deployed in this zone and the negotiating of engineer obstacles will be carried out by first-echelon regiments by allocating the necessary forces reinforced with artillery, including antiaircraft artillery. In addition, there may be sent out from each first-echelon division a forward detachment, comprising up to one motorized rifle (tank) regiment reinforced with artillery and with units and subunits of engineer troops. These forward detachments are sent out for the purpose of fulfilling strictly defined tasks -- the rapid seizure of important installations and lines in the covering zone or right on the enemy's forward defense line, and the holding of them until the arrival of the main forces.

The main forces of first-echelon divisions usually negotiate the enemy covering zone in dispersed formations and columns, ready to deploy from the march in order to destroy covering units in this zone in the event that this task cannot be carried out by the forces of the forward detachments.

By the time the forward detachments cross the state border, the artillery of the main forces of the combined-arms large units must be ready to deploy and, if necessary, must support their actions jointly with aviation. Subsequently, moving at the head of the columns of main forces, the artillery must be ready to deliver fire strikes against the enemy opposing the forward detachments.

With the beginning of the combat actions of the forward detachments, front aviation delivers massed strikes against the nuclear strike means and the main groupings of enemy tactical aviation and ground forces, and also neutralizes his air defense means. The aircraft allocated to support the troops of the armies, first of all, neutralize the centers of enemy resistance and also deliver strikes against his nuclear means, main artillery groupings, second echelons, and immediate reserves, thereby supporting the rapid advance of the forward detachments.

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The efforts of air reconnaissance are directed toward detecting the enemy troop groupings, first of all his nuclear strike means and the nature of his defense, and also toward detecting the composition, deployment areas, and axes of advance of his immediate reserves. It is desirable that, not later than one to two hours before the first-echelon troops move out toward the enemy forward defense line, air reconnaissance provide the staffs of the armies and large units with large-scale aerial photographs of the defense to its entire tactical depth.

The air defense troops concentrate their main efforts on covering the rocket troops and artillery, the second echelons, control organs, and the most important rear installations. Using surface-to-air missile units of the front and the armies, a first line of area coverage is set up. In doing this, the battle formations of the surface-to-air missile units will most often not be deployed along a front but echeloned in depth. Some subunits may be deployed near the unit's deployment area, while it is advisable to move others forward toward the border on the axis of the main attack of the army. Antiaircraft artillery regiments are used for point coverage of important army targets.

While the covering zone is being negotiated, the front (army) commander, on the basis of reconnaissance data on the opposing enemy forces and on the nature of the enemy defense, refines the axis of advance of the first-echelon armies (divisions), directing their actions to breaches and gaps in the enemy troop disposition or onto axes where the actions of the forward detachments have begun to show success.

While the first-echelon large units are advancing toward the forward defense line, front aviation and artillery deliver strikes against it. These strikes are delivered, first of all, against targets located on the axes of advance of the divisions, and also against reserves and other important targets in the enemy's tactical and immediate operational depth.

Exploiting the effects of the artillery and tank fire and the air strikes, the first-echelon troops negotiate the enemy forward defense line from the march and advance to the flanks and rear of his main groupings, destroy them, and develop a rapid offensive into the depth, not becoming involved in drawn-out battles with isolated units to seize centers of enemy resistance

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which have survived in the gaps. It is very important that, during the negotiation of the enemy forward defense line, the tank troops and motorized rifle large units direct their efforts to advancing at the maximum possible rate of advance into the depth of the enemy defense, in order to rout the second echelons and reserves, and also to destroy enemy nuclear strike means and seize the most important areas. Individual enemy groupings and centers of resistance remaining on their flanks and in their rear, as has already been noted, must be destroyed by the army reserves.

An important role in negotiating the enemy forward defense line may be played by tactical airborne landing forces. Their composition, the depth at which they are dropped (landed), and the duration of their actions in the enemy rear, depend for the most part on the nature of the tasks they are carrying out.

If the forward detachments have not been able to penetrate into the enemy defense and create conditions for routing his main forces from the march, the first-echelon divisions will be forced to break through the defense from direct contact, for which they will have to deploy all of their means of destruction in front of the defense line and spend a certain amount of time organizing the routing of the enemy.

Breaking through the enemy defense requires thorough organization. In the decision for the breakthrough, the nature of the enemy defense disposition and, above all, the grouping of his forces and means, are elaborated, and there are specified the axis of the main attack and of other attacks, the breakthrough sectors, the composition of the attack groupings, the operational disposition of the army and the tasks of the troops, the duration and disposition of fire preparation and accompanying fire, the sequence in which units and large units will move out to the assault line, and the locations of control posts and the sequence in which they will be relocated during the attack.

Breaking through the enemy defense requires thorough observation of troop actions, especially on the axis of advance of our attack groupings. For this reason it will become necessary to bring the regimental, division, and army control posts nearer to the forward units, as was done in operations of the Great Patriotic War. To ensure the effectiveness of the fire

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preparation, the enemy defense system on the axes of attacks must, as far as possible, be detected down to the platoon strongpoint, the missile battery, the artillery battery, and the mortar platoon. For this purpose it is often necessary to provide the staffs of the armies, divisions, and regiments with large-scale aerial photographs of the defense. Reconnaissance in force may be employed, making it possible to detect the enemy fire plan with great accuracy. All of these particular features of troop control must be taken into account in organizing the breakthrough of the enemy defense.

Development of an offensive into the depth of enemy territory

In developing an offensive into the enemy depth, the front (army) commander takes measures for the advance of troops, especially tank armies and divisions, at a higher rate of advance in order to disrupt enemy attempts to organize a defense on successive lines or to undertake aggressive actions against the advancing troops. To this end, the commander, having detected the enemy intentions on the basis of reconnaissance data, targets the aviation strikes against detected nuclear means, against main groupings of enemy troops in their concentration areas, and, when moving forward toward the defense lines, against their control posts; at the same time, he maneuvers the forces and means in order to build up their efforts on selected axes, particularly on the main axis. In order to prevent the enemy from occupying lines and positions favorable for defense, not only may air strikes be delivered but forward detachments may be sent out from the divisions and armies of the first echelon, and sometimes also airborne landing forces may be dropped.

An important role in developing an offensive will be played by the timely routing of enemy reserves, as well as by the organized and rapid assault crossing of water obstacles and the quick pursuit of the withdrawing enemy.

The enemy may use his reserves for delivering strong counterattacks against the advancing front (army) troops. In circumstances unfavorable to him, he may refrain from counterattacks and attempt to occupy one of the intermediate defense lines with these reserves. It should be noted that at the present time the enemy possesses substantially greater capabilities to maneuver rapidly with his reserves than in the

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last war and consequently to deliver strong counterattacks against advancing troops. His counterattacks will be accompanied by powerful air strikes and massed employment of artillery.

During an offensive under any conditions it is necessary to strive, first of all, to disrupt the enemy counterattack. This can be achieved by different methods, for example: by systematic air strikes and long-range artillery strikes against enemy reserves and road junctions, by continuous fighting to weaken the enemy aviation grouping, and by delivery of strikes against the basing airfields of the airborne transport aviation. Such actions will obviously reach their greatest intensity during the period when enemy reserves are being deployed to deliver counterattacks. At this time it is possible to employ aviation and artillery in the most purposeful and massed manner and to inflict such losses on the enemy as to force him to refrain from conducting counterattacks. Important circumstances which can disrupt the preparation of a counterattack are a rapid rate of advance and decisiveness in the actions of the advancing front (army) troops, in which they preempt the enemy in seizing favorable lines and thus prevent him from deploying his forces and means to deliver a counterattack.

If success is not achieved in disrupting the enemy counterattack with these actions, he may be repulsed either by a meeting attack of second echelons and reserves together with the large units and units operating here, or by temporarily having part of the forces on the axis of the counterattack go over to defensive actions, and subsequently routing the enemy with strikes by aviation and artillery, and attacks by second echelons and reserves, against the flanks and rear of his groupings. Simultaneously with the repulse of the counterattack, it is necessary to develop an attack into the depth and on other axes.

#### THE GOING OVER TO ACTIONS EMPLOYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The going over to actions employing nuclear weapons is the most probable in a situation in which the enemy loses important installations or areas, main groupings are routed, his capabilities for counteracting the advance of our troops are considerably lowered, and conditions are created for rapid development of an offensive into the depth of the theater of military operations. This going over to the employment of

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nuclear weapons is a qualitatively new transition in the development of an operation, a transition during which it is necessary to achieve a fundamental change in the situation in our favor and to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy in order to attain the goals of the operation within a short time. Successful fulfillment of these tasks depends directly on the thorough organizing and timely implementing of measures which are directed first of all to ensuring constant readiness of forces and means to deliver a powerful surprise nuclear strike against the enemy.

Organizing and delivering the initial front nuclear strike during combat actions which have begun with the employment of only conventional means of destruction will differ fundamentally from the conduct of such a strike at the beginning of a war. This difference is caused by the complexity of the situation and by changes in the status and position both of the targets to be destroyed and of the means of employing nuclear weapons. In addition, the first-echelon troops of both sides will by this time be fully deployed and in direct contact with each other. Thus, in addition to the operational-tactical nuclear means, the tactical nuclear means will also be fully deployed, which will make it possible to include them fully in delivering the initial nuclear strike. In this case, having a substantial quantity of tactical nuclear means, the enemy may carry out a strike of such force that, as a result, serious destruction may be inflicted upon the front troops, especially the first echelon. This circumstance requires that the enemy be preempted in delivering the initial nuclear strike, that the maximum possible quantity of forces and means be allocated to carry it out, and that the enemy's tactical nuclear means also be destroyed without fail in the initial nuclear strike, along with his operational-tactical nuclear means.

In order to achieve this, the front nuclear strike must be delivered literally on the basis of the first indications of enemy preparation to employ nuclear weapons. For this purpose, during non-nuclear actions, the nuclear warheads and the means of delivering them to their targets must be kept constantly at the highest degree of readiness allowed by the technical conditions and the situation. The specific number of these means and their degree of readiness must be specified by the front commander on the basis of the conditions of the situation. In addition, he

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specifies the measures for increasing the protection of the troops against means of mass destruction.

The front staff, in turn, must without fail keep abreast of the situation; make timely changes in the plan for employing nuclear weapons, in line with the commander's decision; constantly correct and ready the plan for the initial nuclear strike; refine the tasks and transmit them immediately to those who are to carry them out; and when necessary give the signals for the shifting of means from one degree of readiness to another. Considering the exceptional importance of this work for ensuring the timely delivery of a nuclear strike, it is advisable for its fulfilment to allocate officers from the operations and intelligence directorates (departments), from the staff of the rocket troops and artillery and the staff of the air army, and also from the department of the chief of the chemical troops, all of whom must work under the leadership of the front chief of staff or his deputy.

Since the front troops are in direct contact with the enemy, the selection of yields for the nuclear warheads, the selection of their delivery vehicles, and the determination of the troop safety line for the attacking troops from the targets to be hit with nuclear weapons, take on special importance. For destroying targets located near our troops, it is best to employ nuclear warheads of low yield (three, five, ten kilotons).

The complexity and the rapid changes of the situation, especially in the positions of the targets to be destroyed and of the means of employing nuclear weapons, will obviously not always enable the front to determine the targets for all of the means allocated for the initial nuclear strike. In connection with this, the need may arise to grant army and division commanders the authority to select targets for their own missile large units and units, based on the tasks they are carrying out.

It will also be very important to inform the armies, divisions, airborne landing forces, air defense troops, and reserves in detail on the tasks which they will have to carry out with the going over to actions employing nuclear weapons, to target them on exploiting the results of the nuclear strike, and to clarify questions of their cooperation with each other. Special measures will need to be taken for protecting troops,

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control posts, and rear installations against enemy nuclear strikes, for eliminating their aftereffects, and for restoring the combat effectiveness of large units and units which have suffered large losses. All of this must be carried out within the shortest time limits, which will require field commanders, commanders, and staffs of all levels to show great exertion and efficient organization in their work.

With the beginning of the employment of nuclear weapons, troop actions will develop according to the conditions of nuclear warfare.

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